Sustainable development calls for choices among alternative policy options. It is a common view that such choices can be justified by appealing to an evaluative ranking of the options with respect to how their consequences affect a broad range of prudential and moral values. Three philosophically motivated proposals for analysing evaluative rankings are discussed: the measured merits model (e.g. Chang), the ordered values model (e.g. Griffin), and the permissible preference orderings model (Rabinowicz). The analysis focuses on the models’ potential for (...) making transparent how an evaluative ranking can contribute to a justified choice among options, particularly in situations that involve diverse values as typically found in debates on sustainable development. Such transparency plays a crucial role when policy rankings are going to be used as arguments in political decision processes. The measured merits model is found to have questionable consequences for the concept of sustainability, while the ordered values model calls for an axiological framework that cannot plausibly be spelled out for sustainability. The permissible preference orderings model is more promising. Its formal structure and its ability to deal with value-pluralism provide an interesting re-structuring of the problem of justifying choices in sustainability issues. (shrink)

Das Buch vermittelt methodische Grundlagen für die Arbeit mit Texten in den Wissenschaften, besonders die Fähigkeit, Inhalt und Argumentation komplexer Texte zu erfassen, wiederzugeben und zu beurteilen. Die Einführung entspricht den fachlichen Standards der Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften, ist fachübergreifend konzipiert und setzt kein spezifisches Wissen voraus. Der Band richtet sich an Studierende verschiedener Fachrichtungen sowie an Personen, die sich mit dem Wissen anderer Fachrichtungen auseinandersetzen oder im Dialog mit der Öffentlichkeit stehen. Mit Fallbeispielen aus verschiedenen Wissensbereichen und kommentierten Literaturhinweisen.

​This book describes argumentative tools and strategies that can be used to guide policy decisions under conditions of great uncertainty. Contributing authors explore methods from philosophical analysis and in particular argumentation analysis, showing how it can be used to systematize discussions about policy issues involving great uncertainty. The first part of the work explores how to deal in a systematic way with decision-making when there may be plural perspectives on the decision problem, along with unknown consequences of what we do. (...) Readers will see how argumentation tools can be used for prioritizing among uncertain dangers, for determining how decisions should be framed, for choosing a suitable time frame for a decision, and for systematically choosing among different decision options. Case studies are presented in the second part of the book, showing argumentation in practice in the areas of climate geoengineering, water governance, synthetic biology, nuclear waste, and financial markets. In one example, argumentation analysis is applied to proposals to solve the climate problem with various technological manipulations of the natural climate system, such as massive dispersion of reflective aerosols into the stratosphere. Even after a thorough investigation of such a proposal, doubt remains as to whether all the potential risks have been identified. In such discussions, conventional risk analysis does not have much to contribute since it presupposes that the risks have been identified, whereas the argumentative approach to uncertainty management can be used to systematize discussions. (shrink)

Based on a framework that distinguishes several types, roles and functions of values in science, we discuss legitimate applications of values in the validation of computer simulations. We argue that, first, epistemic valuesEpistemic values, such as empirical accuracyAccuracy and coherence with background knowledgeBackground knowledge, have the role to assess the credibilityCredibility of simulation results, whereas, second, cognitive valuesCognitive values, such as comprehensiveness of a conceptual modelConceptual model or easy handling of a numerical model, have the role to assess the usefulness (...) of a model for investigating a hypothesisHypothesis. In both roles, values perform what we call first-order functions. In addition, cognitive values may also serve an auxiliary function by facilitating the assessment of credibility. As for a third type of values, i.e. social valuesSocial values, their legitimate role consists in specifying and weighing epistemic and cognitive values with respect to practical uses of a simulation, which is considered a second-order function. Rational intersubjective agreementAgreement on how to specify and weigh the different values is supposed to ensure objectivity in simulation validation. (shrink)

Science-based methods for assessing the practical rationality of a proposed public policy typically represent assumed future outcomes of policies and values attributed to these outcomes in an idealized, that is, intentionally distorted way and abstracted from aspects that are deemed irrelevant. Different types of methods do so in different ways. As a consequence, they instantiate the properties that result from abstraction and idealization such as conceptual simplicity versus complexity, or comprehensiveness versus selectivity of the values under consideration to different degrees. (...) I hold that none of these methods is best in general. Instead, I opt for the valuation method that is useful for the policy issue in question both in terms of its relevance and in terms of its practicability. Relevance requires that the method can represent and account for what is at stake in the policy issue. Practicability refers to aspects such as easy versus difficult handling of the method. To argue for the claim, I evaluate three types of valuation methods: cost–benefit analysis that rests on unidimensional measurement and ranking, multi-criteria decision analysis that applies multi-dimensional measurement but unidimensional ranking, and non-aggregate indicator systems that operate with multi-dimensional measurement and sometimes also multi-dimensional ranking. Second-order justification indicating whether and how the valuation method chosen is capable of accounting for the substantive value considerations that constitute the real-world policy issue in question renders the conditions on which the results of a proposed policy evaluation rest transparent. (shrink)

Dealing with complex problems often requires argumentative skills that go beyond the natural abilities even of gifted students and lecturers. We sketch how to reconstruct and evaluate arguments and outline how the fostering of argumentative skills is integrated into the curriculum in Environmental Sciences at the Department of Environmental Systems Sciences of ETH Zurich.

Model evaluation for long-term climate predictions must be done on quantities other than the actual prediction, and a comprehensive uncertainty quantificationUncertainty quantification is impossible. An ad hoc alternative is provided by coordinated model intercomparisonsModel intercomparisons which typically use a “one model one vote” approach. The problem with such an approach is that it treats all models as independent and equally plausible. Reweighting all models of the ensemble for performance and dependence seems like an obvious way to improve on model democracy, (...) yet there are open questions on what constitutes a “good” model, how to define dependency, how to interpret robustnessRobustness, and how to incorporate background knowledgeBackground knowledge. UnderstandingUnderstanding those issues have the potential to increase confidence in model predictions in modeling efforts outside of climate scienceClimate science where similar challenges exist. (shrink)

Climate model projections are used to inform policy decisions and constitute a major focus of climate research. Confidence in climate projections relies on the adequacy of climate models for those projections. The question of how to argue for the adequacy of models for climate projections has not gotten sufficient attention in the climate modelling community. The most common way to evaluate a climate model is to assess in a quantitative way degrees of “model fit”; i.e., how well model results fit (...) observation-based data (empirical accuracy) and agree with other models or model versions (robustness). However, such assessments are largely silent about what those degrees of fit imply for a model’s adequacy for projecting future climate. We provide a conceptual framework for discussing the evaluation of the adequacy of models for climate projections. Drawing on literature from philosophy of science and climate science, we discuss the potential and limits of inferences from model fit. We suggest that support of a model by background knowledge is an additional consideration that can be appealed to in arguments for a model’s adequacy for long-term projections, and that this should explicitly be spelled out. Empirical accuracy, robustness and support by background knowledge neither individually nor collectively constitute sufficient conditions in a strict sense for a model’s adequacy for long-term projections. However, they provide reasons that can be strengthened by additional information and thus contribute to a complex non-deductive argument for the adequacy of a climate model or a family of models for long-term climate projections. (shrink)

Measurements are shown to be processes designed to return figures: they are effective. This effectivity allows for a formalization as Turing machines, which can be described employing computation theory. Inspired in the halting problem we draw some limitations for measurement procedures: procedures that verify if a quantity is measured cannot work in every case.

Cognitive values like simplicity, broad scope, and easy handling are properties of a scientific representation that result from the idealization which is involved in the construction of a representation. These properties may facilitate the application of epistemic values to credibility assessments, which provides a rationale for assigning an auxiliary function to cognitive values. In this paper, I defend a further rationale for cognitive values which consists in the assessment of the usefulness of a representation. Usefulness includes the relevance of a (...) representation regarding the investigation of a given problem and its practicability for the users. This rationale builds on the claim that any evaluation of scientific representations should pursue two aims: providing information about their credibility and providing information about their usefulness. Cognitive values relating to the usefulness of a representation and epistemic values relating to its credibility both perform a first-order function. Cognitive values are abstract, and several values with first-order functions may conflict in their application. Thus, in order for cognitive values to account for the sort of problem that is to be investigated by means of a representation, they need to be appropriately specified and weighed. Comprehensiveness, complexity, high resolution, and easy handling, for instance, may be required in a first-order function for model-based prediction of regional climate impacts but not for explaining how the global climate system works. Specifying and weighing cognitive and epistemic values relative to a given problem is a legitimate second-order function of social values. (shrink)

Based on a framework that distinguishes several types, roles and functions of values in science, we discuss legitimate applications of values in the validation of computer simulations. We argue that, first, epistemic values, such as empirical accuracy and coherence with background knowledge, have the role to assess the credibility of simulation results, whereas, second, cognitive values, such as comprehensiveness of a conceptual model or easy handling of a numerical model, have the role to assess the usefulness of a model for (...) investigating a hypothesis. In both roles, values perform what we call first-order functions. In addition, cogni¬tive values may also serve an auxiliary function by facilitating the assessment of credibility. As for a third type of values, i.e. social values, their legitimate role consists in specifying and weighing epistemic and cognitive values with respect to practical uses of a simulation, which is considered a second-order function. Rational intersubjective agreement on how to specify and weigh the different values is supposed to ensure objectivity in simulation validation. (shrink)

Weber's Ideal Type as a Method of Forming the Content of Theoretical Concepts in Social Sciences}. Max Weber introduced the ideal type as the specific method of concept formation in social sciences. But the ideal type is not established in social research. Instead, authors in philosophy of science until today try to reconstruct and interpret what Weber said about ideal types as well as what might be their importance in Weber's social theory. The thesis of the following paper is that (...) the difficulties in understanding Weber's ideal types are linked with Weber's intensional logic of concept formation. The thesis is defended in three steps. The first step deals with Weber's understanding of what is a scientific question in cultural sciences. Secondly Weber's critical arguments against positivism, hegelianism and historism are worked out. Thirdly, Weber's method of concept formation is reconstructed. (shrink)

Model evaluation for long term climate predictions must be done on quantities other than the actual prediction, and a comprehensive uncertainty quantification is impossible. An ad hoc alternative is provided by coordinated model intercomparisons which typically use a “one model one vote” approach. The problem with such an approach is that it treats all models as independent and equally plausible. Reweighting all models of the ensemble for performance and dependence seems like an obvious way to improve on model democracy, yet (...) there are open questions on what constitutes a “good” model, how to define dependency, how to interpret robustness, and how to incorporate background knowledge. Under¬standing those issues has the potential to increase confidence in model predictions in modeling efforts outside of climate science where similar challenges exist. (shrink)

Commercial success of big data has led to speculation that big-data-like reasoning could partly replace theory-based approaches in science. Big data typically has been applied to ‘small problems’, which are well-structured cases characterized by repeated evaluation of predictions. Here, we show that in climate research, intermediate categories exist between classical domain science and big data, and that big-data elements have also been applied without the possibility of repeated evaluation. Big-data elements can be useful for climate research beyond small problems if (...) combined with more traditional approaches based on domain-specific knowledge. The biggest potential for big-data elements, we argue, lies in socioeconomic climate research. (shrink)

In climate science, observational gridded climate datasets that are based on in situ measurements serve as evidence for scientific claims and they are used to both calibrate and evaluate models. However, datasets only represent selected aspects of the real world, so when they are used for a specific purpose they can be a source of uncertainty. Here, we present a framework for understanding this uncertainty of observational datasets which distinguishes three general sources of uncertainty: (1) uncertainty that arises during the (...) generation of the dataset; (2) uncertainty due to biased samples; and (3) uncertainty that arises due to the choice of abstract properties, such as resolution and metric. Based on this framework, we identify four different types of dataset ensembles — parametric, structural, resampling, and property ensembles—as tools to understand and assess uncertainties arising from the use of datasets for a specific purpose. We advocate for a more systematic generation of dataset ensembles by using these sorts of tools. Finally, we discuss the use of dataset ensembles in climate model evaluation. We argue that a more systematic understanding and assessment of dataset uncertainty is needed to allow for a more reliable uncertainty assessment in the context of model evaluation. The more systematic use of such a framework would be beneficial for both scientific reasoning and scientific policy advice based on climate datasets. (shrink)

SummaryA discussion of the relations between mathematics and reality has a double aspect: it may concern the status of mathematical concepts and their right to be considered as part of “reality”. But the history of scientific concepts shows that attempts to single out a so‐called reality are arbitrary and futile, and the intrusion of ontological thinking in science apparently has never been fruitful.Another way to look at the problem is to investigate the use of mathematical methods to attain knowledge or (...) power about “reality”, by which is generally meant physics . Many examples from the history of sciences show that it is almost impossible to tell in advance whether a mathematical concept or theory will be useful or not.For the time being, it has not yet been possible to apply mathematics in a significant and pregnant way to various sciences. It is advocated that what is needed are not sophisticated mathematical developments, but some rather simple mathematical structures that still have to be described and applied. The present trends in mathematics, which emphasize the understanding of simple and basic mathematical concepts, allow us to hope that significant progress in these directions can be expected. (shrink)

This book updates and adds to the classic Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies, showing how social movement theory has grown and changed.

Interdisciplinary collaboration figures centrally in frontier research in many fields. Participants in inter-disciplinary projects face problems they would not encounter within their own disciplines. Among those are problems of mutual understanding, of finding a language to communicate both within projects and with the scientific community and society at large, and of needing to master concepts and methods of different disciplines. We think that a concentrated research and development effort is necessary to analyze, on the one hand, cognitive conditions of successful (...) understanding, communication, and interaction and, on the other, to develop specific tools and methods that support and facilitate inter-disciplinarity both in practice and in educational projects that prepare future generations of professionals within and outside of academia. Those tools need to be developed and their cognitive efficiency measured. (shrink)

We show, for any ordinal γ ≥ 3, that the class RaCAγ is pseudo-elementary and has a recursively enumerable elementary theory. ScK denotes the class of strong subalgebras of members of the class K. We devise games, Fⁿ (3 ≤ n ≤ ω), G, H, and show, for an atomic relation algebra A with countably many atoms, that Ǝ has a winning strategy in Fω(At(A)) ⇔ A ∈ ScRaCAω, Ǝ has a winning strategy in Fⁿ(At(A)) ⇐ A ∈ ScRaCAn, Ǝ (...) has a winning strategy in G(At(A)) ⇐ A ∈ RaCAω, Ǝ has a winning strategy in H(At(A)) ⇒ A ∈ RaRCAω for 3 ≤ n < ω. We use these games to show, for γ ≥ 5 and any class K of relation algebras satisfying RaRCAγ ⊆ K ⊆ ScRaCA₅, that K is not closed under subalgebras and is not elementary. For infinite γ, the inclusion RaCAγ ⊂ ScRaCAγ is strict. For infinite γ and for a countable relation algebra A we show that A has a complete representation if and only if A is atomic and Ǝ has a winning strategy in F(At(A)) if and only if A is atomic and A ∈ ScRaCAγ. (shrink)

The shape and function of ethical imperatives may vary if the context is an interaction between strangers, or those who are well acquainted. This idea, taken up from Stephen Toulmin’s distinction between an “ethics of strangers” and an “ethics of intimacy”, can be applied to encounters in healthcare. There are situations where healthcare personnel (HCP) know their patients (corresponding to an “ethics of intimacy”) and situations where HCP do not know their patients (corresponding to “an ethics of strangers”). Does it (...) make a difference for normative imperatives that follow from central concepts and principles in medical ethics whether HCP know their patients or not? In our view, this question has not yet been answered satisfactorily. Once we have clarified what is meant by “knowing the patient”, we will show that the distinction is particularly relevant with regard to some thorny questions of autonomy in healthcare (e.g., regarding advance directives or paternalism in the name of autonomy), whereas the differences with regard to imperatives following from the principles of justice and beneficence seem to be smaller. We provide a detailed argument for why knowing the patient is ethically valuable in encounters in healthcare. Consequently, healthcare systems should provide fertile ground for HCP to get to know their patients, and structures that foster therapeutic continuity. For this to succeed, a number of questions still need to be clarified, which is an important task for medical ethics. (shrink)

Melanesian ethnography has been a substantial and enduring presence in Strathern’s comparative project of anthropology. The cornerstone of this project was The Gender of the Gift, where a model was established for demonstrating the analogies between Melanesian societies based on a system of common differences. The comparisons created in this work were centred on a real and radical divide between Melanesia and the West. Strathern’s subsequent comparative work has examined the debates surrounding new social and technological forms in the West (...) (e.g. new genetic and reproductive technologies) through drawing analogies with Melanesian social forms; she has simultaneously highlighted the limits of these comparisons. Her intention in this comparative project has been to expand the range of concepts and language used to understand western social and technological innovations that potentially affect the world at large, so that debate is not simply circumscribed by western preoccupations and concerns. As mediated through the analysis of Strathern and the other Melanesian anthropologists she draws on, the voices and interests of non-westerners can potentially inform and even reform the grounds of such deliberations. (shrink)

Many neuroimaging studies of semantic memory have argued that knowledge of an object's perceptual properties are represented in a modality-specific manner. These studies often base their argument on finding activation in the left-hemisphere fusiform gyrus-a region assumed to be involved in perceptual processing-when the participant is verifying verbal statements about objects and properties. In this paper, we report an extension of one of these influential papers-Kan, Barsalou, Solomon, Minor, and Thompson-Schill (2003 )-and present evidence for an amodal component in the (...) representation and processing of perceptual knowledge. Participants were required to verify object-property statements (e.g., "cat-whiskers?"; "bear-wings?") while they were being scanned by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We replicated Kan et al.'s activation in the left fusiform gyrus, but also found activation in regions of left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and middle-temporal gyrus, areas known to reflect amodal processes or representations. Further, only activations in the left IFG, an amodal area, were correlated with measures of behavioural performance. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 493 an improvement over what is available. In this way the English reader unable to go to the Spanish originals could benefit greatly. ANTON DONOSO University of Detroit Das Verhdltnis von Philosophie und Theologie im Denken Martin Heideggers. By Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert. Symposium, no. 47. (Freiburg/Miinchen: Karl Alber, 1974. Pp. 340) Sie'fert deals competently not only with Heidegger's own views on the relation between philosophy and theology but (...) with the response they found among philosophers and theologians. From the beginning Heidegger has insisted on the difference in experience at the root of philosophy and theology. This remains true even after the "turn" when Heidegger has much to say about God or gods. At the time when Sein und Zeit appeared Heidegger gave a lecture entitled Phenomenology and Theology, which was published only in 1970.1 He claimed that theology as positive science is not independent from philosophy. What does this mean? A few quotations from the lecture may clarify his viewpoint and show how theological concepts are related to the ontological understanding of secular human existence. "The factual matter [das Vorliegende] (Positum) for theology is its being Christian.... Christian we call faith.... Christ, the crucified God, is for the 'Christian' faith the being that is manifest primarily in faith.... -2 Thus Heidegger holds that "theology itself is primarily founded on faith. ''3 Furthermore, faith as regeneration of the soul transcends the non-Christian existence.4 This means that the believer finds himself in an existential situation in which he cannot avoid taking into consideration the pretheological existence. Therefore, Heidegger says that "in the Christian event as regeneration.., the prebelieving that is disbelieving of Dasein is surpassed. Surpassed does not mean disposed of but lifted on to the new creation and kept and preserved by it. ''~ Thus Heidegger maintains that the concept of "sin as the counterphenomenon to faith as regeneration.., can only be made clear in its meaning by the concept of guilt as an existential of Dasein. ''6 Both the publication of Sein und Zeit and the lecture Phenomenology and Theology belong to the period when Heidegger was a professor at Marburg University and in close contact with R. Bultmann. The historical-temporal structure of Dasein together with the hermeneutic circle, as these terms were developed in Sein und Zeit, became the pivotal issues of Bultmann's theology. Bultmann justifies his reliance on Heidegger (according to a quotation by Siefert, p. 146), claiming that theology as a positive science deals with a specific being (Seiendes) and presupposes a sense of Being that it takes from philosophy. The much-discussed result of Heidegger's influence on Bultmann is his demythologizing of Scripture. Biblical myths, Bultmann argues, are based on a cosmology that, because it belongs to a prescientific age, can no longer be taken for granted by modern man. 7He further agrees with Heidegger that faith is the quality that identifies a Christian. Only "the man of faith" will "hear" the message contained in the Bible. Moreover, faith as regeneration has a temporal character insofar as it liberates the person from his sinful past and directs him to the "new" man in the future. Because of Bultmann's emphasis on faith some critics have reproached him for neglecting Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann. 2Ibid., p. 18. Translations in this review are my own. Ibid., p. 27. 4Ibid., p. 29. Ibid. 6Ibid., p. 30. 7See Kerygma and Myth, ed. H. W. Bartsch (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 3. 494 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY divine grace. In her critique Siefert joins these critics in arguing that Bultmann gains his theological concepts not through being open to the substance of existential structures of Dasein as a matter of principle but on the ground of faith (p. 153). G. Noller, a theologian educated at Tiabingen University, rejects Bultmann's theology and starts with Heidegger's concept of Being. Siefert argues that Noller "misinterprets Heidegger in that he defines God as a being (Seiendes) and falls back into a metaphysical position (p. 157). In Sein und Existenz, says Siefert, Noller states that "God is the destiny (Schickung) of Being, but Being qua nothing may negate God and usher in... (shrink)

This carefully crafted volume concludes the series of works that began with Cultural Thematics. Seung's primary aim is to go beyond the malaise of post-New Critical studies and to reinstate the centrality of contextual understanding in the interpretation of the structure and meaning of a text. In his introductory discussion of "Text and Context" the author undermines the claims of the objectivity of a text, textual solipsism and textual agnosticism in a manner that recalls the previous arguments in philosophy concerning (...) our knowledge of the external world. Starting with an analysis of textual indeterminacy, Seung ranges over a variety of relevant conceptions of the interpretation of a text, touching upon the works of E. D. Hirsch, Schleiermacher, Cleanth Brooks, Dilthey, Gadamer, and others. In a fairly technical chapter, "Semantics and Pragmatics," the distinctions between formal semantics and informal pragmatics are clearly discussed. An analysis of the pragmatic use of language leads to detailed and informative discussions of pragmatic norms, pragmatic functions, and the relevance of authorial intention for an understanding of a given text. Simplifying Seung's lucid and disciplined arguments, it is shown that a proper understanding of a text requires a grasp of the holistic culture in which it is presented, as well as an understanding of regnant cultural themes. Enriched by interpretations of the Odyssey, Oedipus Rex, the Aeneid, Dante's Commedia, and other literary works, Seung displays the art of contextual interpretation in accordance with his own principles. Of special interest is the presentation of the importance of textual coherence for significant textual interpretations. The various analyses of the role of thematics in the understanding of literature in historical context lead to sympathetic appraisals of Gadamer's hermeneutic program and a brief defence of Gadamer against the charge of falling into an historicist relativity. Finally, Seung concludes his illuminating study with a sketch of a cultural morphology that resembles, in embryo, Hegel's phenomenology of culture. This is no accident, insofar as Seung presents, in his concluding outline of the interaction of cultural themes, an admitted variation on Hegel's dialectical theme. By even finding a place for the "existential dimension of thematic dialectic," the author manages to negate and preserve the solipsism of the reader and give recognition virtually to every relevant aspect of a complex hermeneutic process.--G. J. Stack, SUNY College at Brockport. (shrink)

On Roger Bacon's life and works, by A. G. Little. -- Der Einfluss des Robert Grosseteste auf die wissenschaftliche Richtung des Roger Bacon, von L. Baur. -- La place de Roger Bacon parmi les philosophes du xiie siècle, par F. Picavet. -- Roger Bacon and the Latin vulgate, by F. A. Gasquet. -- Roger Bacon and philology, by S. A. Hirsch. -- The place of Roger Bacon in the history of mathematics, by D. E. Smith. -- Roger Bacon und (...) seine Verdienste um die Optik, von E. Wiedemann. -- Roger Bacon's Lehre von der sinnlichen Spezies und vom Sehvorgange, von S. Vogl. -- Roger Bacon's art des wissenschaftlichen Arbeitens dargestellt nach seineer Schrift De speculis, von Würschmidt. -- Roger Bacon et l'horreur du vide, par P. Duhem. -- Roger Bacon : his relations to alchemy and chemistry, by M. M. P. Muir. -- Roger Bacon and gunpowder, by H. W. L. Hime. -- Roger Bacon and medicine, by E. W, Withington. -- Roger Bacon in English literature, by Sir J. E. Sandys. -- Roger Bacon's works with references to the mss. printed editions, by A, G. Little (p. [375]-425). (shrink)

On Roger Bacon's life and works, by A. G. Little.--Der einfluss des Robert Grosseteste auf die wissenschaftliche richtung des Roger Bacon, von Ludwig Baur.--La place de Roger Bacon parmi les philosophes du XIIIe siècle, par François Picavet.--Roger Bacon and the Latin vulgate, by Francis Aidan, cardinal Gasquet.--Roger Bacon and philology, by S. A. Hirsch.--The place of Roger Bacon in the history of mathematics, by David Eugene Smith.--Roger Bacon und seine verdienste um die optik, von Eilhard Wiedemann.--Roger Bacons lehre von (...) der sinnlichen spezies und vom seḣvorgange, von Sebastian Vogl.--Roger Bacons art des wissenschaftlichen arbeitens dargestellt nach seiner schrift De speculis, von J. Würschmidt.--Roger Bacon et l'horreur du vide, par Pierre Duhem.--Roger Bacon, his relations to alchemy and chemistry, by M. M. Pattison Muir.--Roger Bacon and gunpowder, by H. W. L. Hime.--Roger Bacon and medicine, by E. Withington. (shrink)

Andrew von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and Dangerousness in the Sentencing of Criminals New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1985, 220 pp.

This paper is focused on dismissive metaontological views about ontology. The paper's first section deals with radical dismissivism: a view which I interpret as Carnap's. The second section approaches moderate dismissivism: a view which I interpret as Hirsch's. My first claim is stated in section three: that there are significant differences between the mentioned authors. However, current literature on metaontology, not only does not emphasize such differences, but also insinuates that they do not exist. The authors I have in (...) mind here are Eklund and Bennett. In the fourth section, I compare Carnap's radical dismissivism with Hirsch's moderate dismissivism. My second claim is stated in section five: that Carnap's radical dismissivism is more persuasive than Hirsch's moderate one. (shrink)

Plato, in the Phaedrus, expressed forebodings about the written word. And the history of hermeneutics does little to dispel Plato’s prophecy of ills to come. At the present time, observes Professor Hirsch, we are, as regards literary criticism, in the high tide of subjectivism and scepticism. The meaning of Scripture is a new revelation to each generation; the meaning of a literary text is what it means to us today, and whatever meaning the author may have intended is irrelevant. (...) The magisterium of the teacher, as the preserver of a heritage and the conveyor of knowledge, has gone: his reading is no more valid than that of a pupil. On the other hand, to shift the focus of discussion from the text to the author is equally unsatisfactory. This course leads us into a search for influences and an enquiry into authorial habits and experiences. Literary criticism degenerates into futility. We must endeavour to fix on a point between these two extremes, a point where an objectively valid interpretation emerges, an interpretation which links the mind of the reader with the mind of the author. We must presume that the author, when he wrote, meant something determinate by his text. Our task is to discover from the text what he meant. How best to perform this task is the theme of the present book. (shrink)

Marianne Hirsch’s influential concept of postmemory articulates the ethical significance of representing trauma in art and literature. Postmemory, for Hirsch, “describes the relationship of children of survivors of cultural or collective trauma to the experiences of their parents, experiences that they ‘remember’ only as the narratives and images with which they grew up, but that are so powerful, so monumental, as to constitute memories in their own right”. Through appeal to recent philosophical work on memory, the ethics of (...) remembering, and Peter Goldie’s discussion of empathy, I explore the virtues and limitations of Hirsch’s concept of postmemory. I take particular issue with her recent attempt to place author W.G. Sebald in league with the postmemory generation. (shrink)

There is currently debate between deflationists and anti-deflationists about the ontology of persisting objects. Some deflationists think that disputes between, for example, four-dimensionalists (e.g. Ted Sider and David Lewis) and quasi-nihilists (e.g. Peter Van Inwagen and Trenton Merricks) are merely verbal disputes. Anti-deflationists deny this. Eli Hirsch is a deflationist who maintains that many ontological disputes are merely verbal. Theodore Sider maintains that the disputes are not merely verbal. Hirsch and Sider are thus engaged in a metaontological dispute. (...) In this paper, I argue that Hirsch's metaontological dispute with Sider is, by Hirsch's own lights, itself merely verbal. I conclude that the mere verbalness of his metaontological dispute with Sider suggests that Hirsch's account of what makes a dispute merely verbal may be problematic. (shrink)